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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

This appeal arises out of a determination that the at-fault driver was not underinsured and,
therefore, no amount of underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits was due under an automobile
insurance policy ("Policy") issued to Appellant Deena K. Wood ("Wood") by Respondent Farmers
Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers"). R. 57-100. The Policy provides offset UIM coverage
and unambiguously states the amount of UIM coverage is reduced by the amount of the at-fault
driver's bodily injury liability policy limits. 1 R. 88.
Wood was injured in an automobile accident on January 4, 2015. R. 13. The at-fault
driver's bodily injury liability policy limit of $100,000 was equal Wood's UIM policy limit of
$100,000. R. 61, 112. Pursuant to the unambiguous policy language the amount ofUIM coverage
was reduced by the amount of the at-fault driver's bodily injury liability policy leading to a
determination that the at-fault driver was not underinsured and that no amount was owed under
Wood's UIM coverage. R. 115, 119-120.
Wood sued Farmers, Tom Woods Insurance, Inc., and Tom Woods (collectively
"Farmers") claiming entitlement to UIM limits under the terms of the Policy or, alternatively,

1

The two forms ofUIM coverage available and approved in Idaho are offset coverage and
excess coverage. R. 11. With offset UIM coverage, the policy's UIM coverage limits are reduced
by the amount of bodily injury liability coverage held by the at-fault driver. R. 122. With excess
coverage, the policy's UIM coverage limits are not reduced by the amount of bodily injury liability
coverage held by the at-fault driver. R. 122.
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based on representations Tom Woods purportedly made regarding her UIM coverage after the
accident. R. 12-15.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers on the grounds that: (1)
the Policy unambiguously states the amount ofUIM coverage is reduced by the amount of the atfault driver's liability limits and therefore no UIM benefits are owed to Wood based on the UIM
offset provision; (2) there was no pre-accident representation of coverage different from what the
Policy provides that would give rise to coverage by estoppel; and (3) Wood failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that a misrepresentation was made post-accident. R. 195-200.
Wood moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that the offset provision violates
public policy based on two Idaho Supreme Court cases issued prior to Farmers' motion for
summary judgment, Hill v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 150 Idaho 619, 249
P.3d 812 (2011) and Eastman v. Farmers Insurance Company, 164 Idaho 10,423 P.3d 431 (July
30, 2018). R. 204-210. Wood did not seek reconsideration of the district court's rulings on
coverage by estoppel or her claims based on an alleged post-accident misrepresentation. See R.
204-210. The district court denied Wood's motion for reconsideration, concluding the cases cited
by Wood are distinguishable from the case at bar and that the Policy's offset provision is
unambiguous and enforceable. R. 232-237.
The district court's ruling on Woods' motion for summary judgment and motion for
reconsideration should be affirmed for several reasons. First, Hill and Eastman are inapplicable to
the case at bar because they examined different insurance policy provisions. Second, the Idaho
Supreme Court has consistently held that offset provisions are valid, enforceable, and comport
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with public policy, and neither Hill nor Eastman overruled this longstanding precedent. Third,
UIM offset provisions do not impede on the public policy considerations discussed in Hill or

Eastman, and thus neither case provides a basis for overruling this Court's established precedent
upholding UIM offset provisions.

B.

Course of Proceedings.

On December 29, 2016, Wood filed a Complaint for Damages against Farmers. R. 9-11.
The next day, Wood filed an Amended Complaint for Damages ("Amended Complaint") against
Farmers, Tom Woods Insurance, Inc., and Tom Woods, alleging entitlement to UIM benefits under
the terms of the Policy or, alternatively, on the grounds that she relied on representations regarding
her "underinsurance" coverage. R. 12-15. The Amended Complaint asserts causes of action for
breach of contract, misrepresentation, professional negligence, and breach of the insurer's duty to
properly train its agent. R. 14.
Farmers moved for summary judgment on August 9, 2018. R. 39-40. Farmers argued
Wood's breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law because the at-fault driver was not
underinsured under the plain language of the Policy and no UIM benefits are owed based on the
offset of the amount of the at-fault driver's bodily injury limit. R. 46-47. Farmers argued Wood's
claims for misrepresentation, professional negligence, and breach of the duty to properly train fail
as a matter oflaw because no representations were made about UIM coverage prior to the accident,
and thus she was not entitled to additional or different coverage under a theory of estoppel. R. 4748. In response, Wood did not raise any arguments about the offset provision being deceptive and
misleading, or even ambiguous. See R. 129-133. Instead, she argued that: (1) she did not receive a
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copy of the Policy; (2) the declarations page she had did not specifically mention offset coverage;
and (3) she believed she had excess coverage based on Tom Woods' statements. Id. However, Mr.
Woods' purportedly misleading statement that Wood had "$100,000 of underinsured motorist"
was made after the accident. R. 107, 111.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers. R. 195-200. The district
court held that Wood's claim for breach of contract fails as a matter of law "because the plain
language of the policy unambiguously states that the amount ofUIM coverage will be reduced by
the full amount of the at-fault driver's liability limits." R. 197-198. The district court held that
Wood's claims for misrepresentation, professional negligence, and breach of the duty to properly
train fail as a matter of law on the grounds that she did not raise an issue of material fact that a
misrepresentation had been made. R. 198-199. The district court further held that Farmers is not
estopped from reducing its UIM coverage pursuant to the plain language of the Policy because
nothing in the record indicated that Tom Woods made statements contrary to the coverage
provided. R. 198-200.
Wood moved for reconsideration of the district court's summary judgment order.
R. 204-210. Wood did not provide any new facts or authority in support of her motion, instead
citing to two cases extant at the time Farmers moved for summary judgment and arguing for the
first time that the Policy's provision for offset coverage violates Idaho public policy. R. 204-210.
Wood did not move for reconsideration of any other ruling by the district court. Id. On
January 28, 2019, the district court entered its order denying Wood's motion for reconsideration,
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concluding the cases cited by Wood are distinguishable from the case at bar and that the Policy's
offset provision is unambiguous and enforceable. R. 232-237.
Wood timely filed a Notice of Appeal on February 7, 2019. R. 238-240. Although the
Notice of Appeal references both the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration, the issue on appeal pertains solely to the issue raised in the motion
for reconsideration. Id. The Notice of Appeal does not raise any issues pertaining to the arguments
raised in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See id. Appellant's Brief
does not present any argument or legal authority pertaining to the district court's grant of summary
judgment dismissing all causes of action against all of the Respondents, other than the public policy
argument aimed at the UIM offset provision.

C.

Statement of Facts.

On January 4, 2015, Wood was involved in a motor vehicle accident ("Accident") in Latah
County, Idaho. R. 13. Wood was traveling southbound on Highway 95 when the at-fault driver's
vehicle crossed into her lane and collided with her vehicle. Id. There is no dispute regarding fault.
At the time of the Accident, Wood's vehicle was an insured vehicle under Farmers' Policy.
R. 58. The Policy provided UIM coverage up to $100,000.00 per individual. R. 61. The Policy
included the following express limitation on the amount of UIM coverage:
The amount of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage we will pay shall be reduced
by the full amount of any bodily injury liability bonds or policies available to
any party held liable for the accident regardless of the insured person's actual
recovery from the liable party.
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R. 88 (emphasis in original). The at-fault driver had $100,000 in bodily injury liability coverage
through his insurer, Safeco Insurance. R. I 02, 112.
Prior to her accident, Wood received a disclosure statement from Farmers explaining the
difference between "excess" UIM coverage and "offset" (also known as "difference in limits")
coverage. R. 124-125. The disclosure form specifically states: "Your insurance policy offers
'Difference in Limits."' Id.
Within weeks of the accident, on January 21, 2015, a Farmers claims representative sent
Wood a letter explaining that no UIM benefits were owed under the Policy because the amount of
the at-fault driver's liability limits were equal to the amount of her UIM limits. R. 115.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

Farmers believe that the "Issues Presented on Appeal" can be more clearly and concisely
stated as follows:
1.

Has Wood waived arguments relating to the district court's summary judgment

2.

Based on Idaho Supreme Court precedent pertaining to offset UIM coverage, did

ruling?

the district court err in holding the offset provision does not violate Idaho public policy?
3.

Is Wood entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

III.

ARGUMENT

The sole issue presented by Wood on appeal is whether the UIM offset provision violates
public policy. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that offset UIM provisions are valid,
enforceable, and do not violate public policy. This longstanding precedent has not been overruled
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and the district court did not err in its straightforward application of this precedent. Moreover,
offset UIM provisions were not at issue in either of the two cases Wood relies upon, Eastman v.
Farmers Insurance Company, 164 Idaho 10,423 P.3d 431 (July 30, 2018) and Hill v. American
Family Mutual Insurance Company, 150 Idaho 619, 249 P.3d 812 (2011), and the policy

considerations at issue in those cases are inapplicable in the context of offset UIM coverage. In
fact, the Hill Court approved of offsetting the amount of the at-fault driver's policy limits against
the amount of the insured' s UIM limits. Thus, neither of the cases Wood relies on establish that
the offset provision at issue violates public policy.

A.

Standard of Review.

When deciding a motion to reconsider, this Court applies the same standard of review that
the district court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. Petrus Family
Tr. Dated May 1, 1991 v. Kirk, 163 Idaho 490, 501, 415 P.3d 358, 369 (2018). "Thus, when a

motion to reconsider follows the grant of summary judgment, "this Court must determine whether
the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id.
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment and
provides in relevant part:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense, or
the part of each claim or defense, on which summary judgment is sought. The court
must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
I.R.C.P. 56(a).
When a party moves for summary judgment under Rule 56, the non-moving party "must
not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
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issue of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). The non-moving
party must set forth specific facts which show a genuine issue. Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance
Co., 107 Idaho 335,689 P.2d 227 (Ct.App. 1984). Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

states in pertinent part:
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: ... grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including the facts
considered undisputed, show that the movant is entitled to it[.]

I.R.C.P. 56(e).

B.

Analysis.
1.

Wood has not made any assignments of error or presented argument
or authority relating to the district court's summary judgment rulings
and has therefore waived any arguments relating to those rulings; the
only issue preserved on appeal is whether the UIM policy language is
void as against public policy.

Under Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, an appellant's brief "shall contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefore,
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." I.A.R.
35(a)(6). "If an appellant fails to "assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support
his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by
this Court." PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho 33, 423 P.3d 454,459 (2018). General attacks
on the district court's conclusions will not be considered on appeal "absent specific reference to
evidentiary or legal errors." Id. "Arguments of this type are deemed to have been waived." Id.
The only issue raised in Wood's Notice of Appeal is: "whether the current law [regarding
public policy] on the underinsured claims of plaintiff were not followed by the District Court."
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R. 239. The issues raised in Appellant's Brief all pertain to whether the district court erred in
concluding the offset provision did not violate public policy. Appellant's Brief 2-3. Although the
Notice of Appeal states that Wood is appealing the district court's Memorandum Opinion and
Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, neither the Notice of Appeal nor the
Appellant's Brief raise any issues, errors, argument, or authorities pertaining to the district court's
rulings on Farmers' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Wood has not raised any issues,
errors, arguments or authorities regarding the district court's ruling that her breach of contract
claim fails as a matter of law because the plain language of the Policy unambiguously states that
the amount ofUIM coverage will be reduced by the amount of the at-fault driver's liability limit.
R. 239, Appellant's Brief 2-3. Nor has Wood raised any issues regarding the district court's ruling
that her claims for misrepresentation, professional negligence, and breach of the duty to properly
train fail as a matter of law because she did not raise an issue of material fact that a
misrepresentation had been made. R. 239, Appellant's Brief 2-3. Nor has Wood raised any issue
regarding the district court's ruling that Farmers is not estopped from reducing its UIM coverage
pursuant to the plain language of the Policy because nothing in the record indicated that Wood's
agent made statements that were contrary to the coverage provided. R. 239, Appellant's Brief2-3.
Because Wood has not made any specific assignments of error or presented any legal
arguments or authority with regard to the district court's rulings on summary judgment, she has
waived all arguments relating to the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all
causes of action against all of the defendants. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Farmers.
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2.

Offset coverage does not violate public policy.

The only issue preserved on appeal is whether the UIM policy language is void as against
public policy. This Court has consistently upheld offset coverage provisions and the cases cited by
Wood do not abrogate this precedent. Moreover, the cases cited by Wood do not support the
argument that offset coverage is void as against public policy and the public policy considerations
at issue in those cases are inapplicable in the context of offset coverage.

a.

This Court has consistently held that offset UIM coverage does
not violate public policy and therefore the district court
properly concluded that the offset provision at issue is valid and
enforceable under Idaho law.

Wood argues on appeal that the district court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration is
in error because the district court "went back to cases decided before Hill citing American Foreign

Insurance Co. v. Reichart, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004) and the 1995 decision in Mutual of
Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851,908 P.2d 153 (1995)." Appellant's Brief 5-6.
Reichart and Box both specifically address the validity of offset UIM coverage, and neither
case has been overruled by this Court. Neither the Hill nor Eastman decision overruled Reichart,

Box, or any other Idaho case in which offset provisions were upheld and enforced. See generally
Hill, 150 Idaho 619, 249 P .3d 812, Eastman, 160 Idaho 10, 423 P .3d 431. In fact, Reichart is cited
by both the majority and the dissent in Hill. Hill, 150 Idaho at 624, 634, 249 P.3d at 817, 827. In

Reichart, this Court held that offset provisions are not contrary to public policy. Reichert, 140
Idaho at 399-400, 94 P.3d at 704-05 (2004). In Box, this Court held that offset provisions are valid
and enforceable so long as they are unambiguous. Box, 127 Idaho at 854, 908 P .2d at 156, see also

Howard v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214, 219, 46 P.3d 510, 515 (2002) (offset provision
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unambiguously stating UIM coverage would be reduced by amounts received from tortfeasor's
liability carrier was valid and enforceable). Thus, it is well established under long standing Idaho
law that offset UIM provisions are not contrary to public policy and will be upheld so long as they
are unambiguous.
On appeal, Wood has not argued that the offset provision is ambiguous, nor has she
assigned any error to the district court's ruling that the she is not owed UIM benefits under the
plain and unambiguous Policy language. R. 239, see generally Appellant's Brief. In support of her
'

motion for reconsideration, Wood argued the offset provision was ambiguous, as well as deceptive
and misleading. R. 206-209. However, her arguments were not based on ambiguity of the offset
provision language; these arguments were based on the allegations that she did not receive a copy
of her Policy, that the offset provision was "hidden" in the Policy and not specifically referenced
on the declarations page, and that her agent told her she had UIM coverage. R. 208. Because Wood
has not raised any argument that the language of the offset provision is ambiguous, this argument
is waived. PHH Mortg., 164 Idaho 33, 423 P.3d at 459. Because the Court has ruled that offset
provisions are valid and enforceable so long as they are unambiguous, the offset provision should
be upheld because Wood has failed to identify any ambiguity with the language of the offset
provision or otherwise presented argument or legal authority that the language is ambiguous. See

Box, 127 Idaho at 854, 908 P .2d at 156.
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b.

Hill and Eastman do not support the argument that offset
provisions are void as against public policy; the Hill Court
upheld offsetting the amount of the at-fault driver's liability
limits against the amount of an insured's UIM limits.

Wood argues the district court should have disregarded longstanding precedent from this
Court specifically holding that offset UIM coverage does not violate public policy, and instead
should have invalidated the offset provision based on this Court's holdings in Hill and Eastman.
However, the validity of offset coverage was simply not at issue in either case; Hill dealt with the
validity of exhaustion clauses and Eastman dealt with the validity of a non-owned vehicle
exclusion. See generally Hill, 150 Idaho 619, 249 P .3d 812, Eastman, 160 Idaho 10, 423 P .3d 431.
Consequently, neither Hill nor Eastman support finding the UIM offset provision is void as against
public policy.
Further, Woods' argument that Hill establishes offset provisions are invalid is flatly
contradicted by the Court's holding. The Court in Hill upheld offsetting the amount of bodily
injury liability coverage against the amount of the UIM coverage as part of the remedy for voiding
exhaustion clauses. The exhaustion clause at issue in Hill requires the insured to exhaust the atfault driver's bodily injury limits before she could receive UIM benefits under her policy. Hill,
150 Idaho at 621, 249 P.3d at 814. The insurer denied UIM benefits because she settled with the
at-fault driver for $1,000 less than the amount of the bodily injury liability limit. Id. The Court
held the exhaustion clause was void because it was contrary to principles of judicial economy to
require full exhaustion, by either litigation or settlement, before an insured could receive UIM
benefits. Id. at 627, 249 P .3d at 820. The Court further held that UIM insurers are required to
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attempt to resolve UIM claims in good faith regardless of the insured's actual recovery from the
at-fault driver and insurers will "receive credit for the full amount of the tortfeasor's policy." Id.
Thus, Hill explicitly approved of offsetting the amount of an at-fault driver's liability limits
against the amount of an insured's UIM limits. Id. at 628-30, 249 P.3d at 821-823.
•

"The UIM carrier will receive credit for the full amount of the tortfeasor's policy,
regardless of the insured's actual recovery." Id. at 628,249 P.3d at 821.

•

"Hill will not receive a better deal than she bargained for if she can show that an
underinsured tortfeasor is liable to her for an amount exceeding his policy limits
and then sets off those policy limits against her UIM recovery." Id.

•

"Claimants need not exhaust the limits of the tortfeasor's policy, but instead must
credit to the UIM insurer the gap between the settlement with the tortfeasor's
insurer, if any, and the policy limits." Id. at 630, 249 P.3d at 823.

•

Although not specifically identified as UIM offset coverage in Hill, it appears that
was the coverage at issue and this Court held that although the exhaustion clause
was void, the rest of the policy "remained intact." Id. at 628,249 P.3d at 821.

These rulings by this Court precisely describe how UIM offset coverage works; the amount
of the UIM coverage is reduced by the amount of the tortfeasor's liability limits "regardless of the
insured person's actual recovery from the liable party." R. 88. Like the plaintiff in Hill, Wood is
not entitled to a better deal than that for which she bargained. Wood bargained for offset UIM
coverage, and therefore the amount of the at-fault driver's policy limits are offset against the
amount of her UIM coverage. Because Hill expressly approved of crediting the amount of the at-
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fault driver's policy limits against the amount of the insured's UIM coverage, this case in no way
establishes that offset UIM coverage violates public policy on the grounds that the offset provision
"erodes" UIM coverage. Hill approved of a reduction of UIM coverage in the form of a credit
against the amount ofUIM benefits available to the insured. In other words, Hill approved of UIM
offset coverage.

c.

The public policy consideration at issue in Hill and Eastman do
not arise in the context of UIM offset coverage.

The public policy considerations underlying the Hill decision do not apply in the context
of UIM offset coverage. The Court reasoned in Hill that judicial economy would not be promoted
if an insured had to litigate against the at-fault driver's insurer to obtain policy limits in order to
protect her rights to UIM benefits under her own policy. Hill. at 627, 249 P.3d at 820. Unlike
exhaustion clauses, UIM offset coverage provisions do not deter judicial economy. The insured
does not have to litigate against the at-fault driver's insurer or jump through any other procedural
hoops to be entitled to UIM benefits. Instead, under Hill, the UIM insurer simply credits the
amount of the at-fault driver's policy limits against the amount of the UIM coverage, and the
balance (if any) is the amount of UIM benefits available to the insured. Thus, the Hill case and
public policy considerations at issue in that case do not support the argument that UIM offset
coverage is void as against public policy. The offset provision here does not require exhaustion of
the bodily injury policy limits before UIM coverage is triggered because the offset provision here
applies "regardless of the insured person's actual recovery." R. 88. The UIM offset provision
promotes judicial economy.
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Finally, the Hill Court determined that approval of terms in an insurance policy by the
Director of the Department oflnsurance creates a presumption that the terms are valid and comport
with public policy. Hill at 624, 249 P .3d at 817. The Director of the Department of Insurance has
the power to invalidate an insurance policy if its terms are inconsistent, ambiguous, misleading, or
"deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract, or
which are unfairly prejudicial to the policy holder." Id. In 2008, the legislature amended Idaho
Code§ 41-2502(1) to require automobile insurers to offer UIM coverage. Hill at 623,239 P.3d at
816. Thereafter, the Director of the Department of Insurance issued a bulletin explaining the new
law and providing a sample disclosure statement. R. 121-123. The bulletin explains and approves
the two most common types of UIM coverage: offset coverage and excess coverage. Id. Because
the Director of the Department of Insurance expressly approved of offset coverage subsequent to
the amendment to Idaho Code§ 41-2502(1), a presumption exists that offset coverage comports
with Idaho public policy. See Hill, at 624, 249 P .3d at 817. None of the arguments raised by Wood
rebut this presumption. As discussed above, she has not even raised any arguments on appeal about
the Policy language being ambiguous, misleading or deceptive.
The public policy considerations underlying the Eastman decision also do not apply in the
context of UIM offset coverage. The policy provision at issue in Eastman was an exclusion
eliminating entirely UIM coverage in situations where the insured was riding in another vehicle
that had UIM coverage ("non-owned vehicle exclusion"). Eastman, 164 Idaho 10, 423 P .3d at 43334. Although the plaintiff had UIM coverage with limits of $500,000 under her own policy, she
had no UIM coverage regardless of amount based on this exclusion if she was injured while riding
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in a vehicle covered under a policy that also had UIM coverage. Id. The subject offset provision
in Wood's Policy does not eliminate UIM coverage like the non-owned vehicle exclusion did in

Eastman; only the amount of that coverage is affected. Therefore, the public policy concerns raised
in Eastman do not apply here.
In Eastman, this Court held the non-owned vehicle exclusion entirely eliminating UIM
coverage violated public policy and was therefore void. Id. at 436. The Court reasoned that
"insuring UIM coverage for an insured's claims up to her policy limits avoids the absurd result
where Idahoans injured by a totally uninsured driver would sometimes recover more than those
injured by underinsured drivers." Id. The Court further reasoned that the purpose ofUIM coverage
is to protect the public from underinsured motorists, and this public policy was thwarted by the
non-owned vehicle exclusion because it "eviscerates" UIM coverage depending on the vehicle the
insured is riding in. Id. Although Eastman had purchased $500,000 in UIM coverage, she received
less than $50,000 from the UIM carrier of the vehicle she was riding in as well as $50,000 from
the at-fault driver. Id. at 433 . Here, Wood was insured up to the limits of her UIM coverage and
the offset provision does not eviscerate that coverage.
Wood tries to extend Hill and Eastman to establish that UIM provisions are invalid if they
"erode" or "dilute" UIM coverage. See generally Appellant's Brief. As a preliminary matter, the
offset provision does not erode or dilute UIM coverage; it simply defines when an at-fault driver
is underinsured. If the insured has incurred damages equal to or exceeding her UIM limits, offset
coverage entitles her to damages totaling her UIM limits whether received through the at-fault
driver's insurer, the UIM carrier, or some combination ofbenefits from the at-fault driver's insurer
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and the insured's UIM carrier totaling the amount of the UIM limit. When the amount of the atfault driver's policy limits equal or exceed the amount of UIM policy limits, the at-fault driver is
not underinsured and the injured party can collect damages up to her UIM limits. When the amount
of the at-fault driver's policy limits are less than the amount of the injured party's UIM limits, the
injured party can collect damages up to her UIM policy limits from a combination of benefits from
the liability and UIM policies. To the extent offsetting the amount of UIM limits against the
amount of bodily injury limits is considered an "erosion" of UIM coverage, this erosion has been
upheld by this Court. Hill 150 Idaho at 628-30, 249 P.3d at 821-23. Hill expressly approved of
offsetting the amount of an at-fault driver's liability limits against the amount of the insured's UIM
limits. Id.
Another erosion of UIM coverage implicitly upheld by Hill and Eastman is the UIM policy
limit itself. See Hill, 150 Idaho at 630, 249 P .3d at 823, Eastman, 164 Idaho 10, 423 P .3d at 436-3 7.
No matter the amount of damages, an insured can never recover more than UIM policy limits.
Thus, UIM limits can prevent an insured from being "fully" compensated for her injuries in cases
where the insured's damages exceed her UIM limits. Under Wood's theory there can be no
limitation placed on her UIM recovery if her damages exceed the policy limits.
UIM coverage is by no means a guarantee that the insured will be fully compensated for
injuries caused by the at-fault driver. UIM benefits are limited by the language of the policy as
well as the policy limits. The fact that a UIM provision limits the amount of UIM benefits available
to the insured does not establish that the provision violates public policy. Wood argues that any
erosion ofUIM benefits violates public policy. Appellant's Brief. 5-6. Taken to its logical extreme,
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this would require the insurer to compensate its insured for all damages she incurs regardless of
the policy language or UIM limits. In other words, the insured could be entitled to a much better
deal than she bargained for, a result disapproved ofby Hill. Hill, 150 Idaho at 628,249 P.3d at 821
("Hill will not receive a better deal than she bargained for if she can show that an underinsured
tortfeasor is liable to her for an amount exceeding his policy limits and then sets off those policy
limits against her UIM recovery.").
The public policy considerations underlying Eastman are inapplicable in the context of
offset coverage. There is no potential for an absurd result where an injured person may recover
substantially more depending on the amount of the at-fault driver's bodily injury limits and/or lack
of insurance entirely. Nor is there any potential that an insured would ever receive less than the
amount of her UIM limits, whether from the at-fault driver, her UIM carrier, or some combination
of the two, assuming her damages meet or exceed her UIM limits. In other words, offset UIM
coverage does not have a tendency to eviscerate or annul UIM coverage. Assuming the insured
has incurred damages equal to or exceeding her UIM limits, the insured will be entitled to damages
totaling the amount of her UIM limits whether by receiving this amount through the at-fault
driver's insurer (as was the case here), through the UIM carrier (e.g., if the at-fault driver was
uninsured) or through some combination of benefits from the at-fault driver's insurer and the
insured's UIM carrier (e.g., bodily injury liability limits in the amount of $25,000 from the at-fault
driver's carrier and $75,000 from the insured's carrier under UIM coverage). In any of these
scenarios, the insured receives payment of damages totaling her UIM limits, albeit the source of
payment varies.
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Thus, the offset UIM provision has no tendency to violate the public policy considerations
at issue in Eastman. The insured will always have UIM coverage regardless of the at-fault driver's
liability limit. The offset provision does not pose any potential for the evisceration or annulment
ofUIM coverage because the insured will receive an amount equal to her UIM policy limits. If the
at-fault driver's liability limit is less than her UIM limit, the insured will be entitled to UIM benefits
totaling the difference between the two limits. Offset coverage does not the create the absurd result
that arose in Eastman whereby the insured may receive substantially more or less coverage
depending on the at-fault driver's insurance coverage or lack thereof. The insured will receive
payment of damages totaling her UIM limits whether from the at-fault driver's insurer, her UIM
carrier, or some combination of the two. Here, Wood will receive compensation in at least the
amount of her UIM coverage ($100,000). Appellant's Briefp. 1. Thus, Eastman does not support
the argument that the offset provision is void as against public policy.
Moreover, Hill supports the argument that the Policy's offset provision is not void as
against public policy. The offset provision states that Farmers will take a credit for the amount of
the at-fault driver's liability limits. R. 88. By taking this credit, the amount of UIM benefits
available to Wood was reduced to zero because the at-fault driver's bodily injury limit was equal
to the Policy's UIM limit. R. 61, 102, 112. 2 Hill approved of allowing the insurer to take this credit.

Hill, 150 Idaho at 628, 249 P.3d at 821. Based on Wood's argument, it is the taking of this credit
that violates public policy. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has approved of, and in fact created,

2

Meaning that the at-fault driver was not underinsured- Wood is entitled to $100,000 in
damages, the same amount as her UIM policy limits.

19

the credit which Wood attacks as violative of public policy. Because Hill approves of offsetting
the amount of the at-fault driver's bodily injury limits against the amount of the insured's UIM
limits, the offset provision at issue does not violate public policy.

3.

Wood is not entitled to a holding from this Court that Farmers must
pay the full amount of her UIM limits.

Wood requests that this Court not only invalidate the UIM offset provision, but also hold
that Farmers owes $100,000 to Wood. Appellant's Brief p. 7. The amount of damages owed to
Wood, if any, is a question of fact for the jury to decide on remand. See e.g. Bratton v. Scott, 150
Idaho 530, 535-36, 248 P.3d 1265, 1270-71 (2011).

4.

Wood is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because she has not
identified her claim for attorney fees as an issue on appeal and does not
provide any statutory authority or argument in support of her claim
for attorney fees.

Requests for attorney fees on appeal will not be considered unless "supported by legal
authority or argument." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364,369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). Under
the Idaho Appellate rules, "[ a]ny party seeking attorney fees on appeal must assert a claim as an
issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party." Id. (citing I.A.R. 35). The
party must state the basis for his of her claim for attorney fees and support this claim "with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and part of the transcript and record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(5), (6).
"Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract."
Bream, 139 Idaho at 369, 79 P .3d at 728. A party seeking attorney fees must cite to the specific

statute or contract he or she relies upon in support of the claim, and "must then provide a reasoned
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argument, supported by case law as necessary, explaining why that statutory or contractual
provision entitles the party to an award of attorney fees in this instance." Id.
Wood's request for attorney fees is deficient for several reasons. First, Wood has not
asserted her claim for attorney fees as an issue presented in her first appellate brief, as is required
by Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a)(5). See Appellant's Brief2-3. Second, Wood does not
cite to any statute, contract, or any other authority she relies upon in support of her claim for
attorney fees. See Appellant's Brief p. 3. Because Wood cites no statutory or contractual authority
in support of her claim, she similarly fails to provide a reasoned argument explaining why these
unidentified authorities entitle her to an award of attorney fees in this instance. Id. Wood only
makes a general and conclusory request for attorney fees based on the allegation that Farmers did
not timely pay her UIM claim. Id. Because Wood has not made a proper request for attorney fees
under Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 or provided any contractual or statutory bases for an
award of fees, the Court should deny her request for attorney fees on appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Amended Complaint should
be affirmed. The district court's denial of Woods' motion for reconsideration of its order on
summary judgment should be affirmed. Woods' request for attorney fees on appeal should be
denied.
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